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Abstract 
This note offers an analytical framework aimed at explaining how individual agents purposefully act with 
the goal of managing the value of their information sets. Agents undertake a process of private 
accumulation of information, which takes into account the non-rival nature of this peculiar entity. Non 
rivalry introduces an externality that might trigger long-term endogenous fluctuations. The dynamics of 
interaction, namely the possibility of entering or exiting the group to which the individuals belong, will 
determine time trajectories for the information flows that are unique for the specific conditions of 
interaction that are being considered at a given moment. 
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O VALOR DA INFORMAÇÃO PRIVADA NO CONTEXTO DE GRUPOS EM EVOLUÇÃO 
 
Resumo 
Este artigo apresenta uma estrutura analítica que tem por objetivo explicar como é que os agentes 
individuais atuam, de modo intencional, com o propósito de gerir o valor da informação que detêm. Os 
agentes prosseguem um processo de acumulação privada de informação, o qual toma em consideração 
a natureza não rival desta entidade que detém características específicas. A não rivalidade introduz uma 
externalidade que pode despoletar flutuações endógenas de longo prazo. A dinâmica de interação, 
nomeadamente a possibilidade de entrar ou sair do grupo a que os indivíduos pertencem, vai 
determinar a formação de trajetórias no tempo para os fluxos de informação, as quais são únicas para 
as condições particulares de interação que estão a ser consideradas num determinado momento. 
 
Palavras chave: Fluxos de informação. Dinâmica de grupo. Externalidades. Não rivalidade. Flutuações 
endógenas. Memória transactional. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Information is an economic entity with special features. Its non rival and non exclusive 
character and its nature as a pervasive input in every economic activity, make it an important 
source of discussion in economics and managerial sciences. This letter introduces a simple 
model to explain the foundations on which the accumulation of information, by an individual 
agent on a given subject, is built upon. At each time period, some of the available information 
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is lost, through obsolescence or depreciation, and new information is generated from a 
production function that has, as its single input, the information already obtained. Production 
of new information is subject to an externality effect, given the non rival nature that it 
involves. This externality is positive when the value of the information held by the whole of the 
group to which the individual currently belongs is larger than the value of the information that 
the individual possesses, and it is negative in the opposite circumstance. The intuition is that 
the individual benefits from being in contact with a group that owns relatively good 
information, but is penalized from interacting with a group that is in possession of information 
of poor quality (relatively to the one held by the agent herself). 
The mechanism of generation of information is adapted from Gomes (2008), where a 
setup of competing technologies has been explored. In a similar way as in the mentioned 
paper, the externality effect will trigger a tension between information acquisition and 
information loss that, for particular conditions of the proposed environment, eventually 
generates endogenous fluctuations. The specific shape of the information flow will be 
determined basically by the number of individuals in the assumed group and by their initial 
endowments of information. An example will show that one cannot obtain the exact same 
trajectory for the value of an individual's information if one takes two different scenarios of 
interaction, no matter how close they are from each other (both in terms of initial conditions 
and of number of agents within the group). 
The analysis to undertake may be applied in several contexts. For instance, it can be 
useful to approach, at a micro level, the re-shaping of social structures and the formation of 
groups given the profile of the individuals on the considered universe. This subject is explored, 
e.g., in Tantipathananandh, Berger-Wolf and Kempe (2007) and Tang, Wang and Liu (2011). It 
can also be a subject of interest for macroeconomics. It is by now well accepted that the 
economic science can no longer base most of its reasoning on the concept of representative 
agent. It is the interaction between heterogeneous agents within complex systems that will 
better describe real patterns of evolution of the economic variables. The economic system is a 
complex system characterized by agent heterogeneity, adaptation and evolution, out-of-
equilibrium dynamics, path dependence and unique features that cannot be replicated by 
changing the dimension or the specificities of the interaction process. See Arthur, Durlauf and 
Lane (1997), Blume and Durlauf (2005), Markose (2005) and Holt, Rosser and Colander (2010) 
for an approach to economic complexity in systems of interacting agents. 
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 briefly addresses general dynamic properties. Section 4 highlights possible long-term 
outcomes by resorting to a numerical example. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INFORMATION 
 
Consider a discrete set of individuals INN  , with n elements. Agent iN is endowed, 
at a given time period, with a given amount of relevant information. The value of this 
information at time t is translated on the index 
i
t . The value of the information set will 
evolve according to the following dynamic rule, 
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Difference equation (1) describes a process through which, at time t+1, agent i will 
hold the information that she already possessed at t, minus the lost information [(0,1) 
represents a rate of information obsolescence or depreciation] and plus the eventual 
generation of new information. New information emerges as characterized in the last term of 
the expression. One assumes a production function for information, f(.), with private 
information (the one detained by the agent herself) being the only endogenous input. Function 
f is supposed to be continuous and differentiable, and it will be subject to positive but 
decreasing marginal returns: f’>0 and f’’<0. Below, it will be useful to assume an explicit 
functional form; let  )()( it
i
t Af  , with A>0 a parameter that translates the contribution of 
other variables besides information for the generation of new information and (0,1) an 
elasticity parameter.  
Function  .i  respects to an externality that occurs in the process of creation of 
information. The externality intends to capture the following ideas: 
1) If the average value of the information held by the whole of the individuals in a 
given group is larger than the value of information of agent i, this has a positive 
effect on the process of generation of new information for the individual agent, 
i.e., if 
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2) If the average value of the information held by the whole of the individuals in a 
given group is lower than the value of information of agent i, this has a negative 
effect on the process of generation of new information for the individual agent, 
i.e., if 
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3) If the average value of the information held by the whole of the individuals in a 
given group is exactly the same as the value of information of agent i, this has 
no effect on the process of generation of new information for the individual 
agent, i.e., if 
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The above reasoning intends to describe a special feature of information as an 
economic good. It is harder to create new information when individuals already have an 
informational advantage relatively to their partners in the group relation. On the contrary, a 
positive externality is likely to arise when other individuals have more information, given the 
non rival nature of this entity. 
A function that translates well the properties one has described above is the following,  
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Parameter >0 measures how relevant the externality is for the generation of new 
information. When the informational advantage relatively to the other agents is large, the 
negative externality that emerges may imply a loss of the value of the information index 
relatively to the previous time period. 
 
3 PROPERTIES OF THE INFORMATION EQUATION 
 
Suppose that all agents in a group N are endowed with a same information technology, 
sharing the values of the parameters , A,  and , and that the only thing that distinguishes 
them is initial endowments. In this case, it is straightforward to compute a steady-state value 
*  that will be common to all the individuals. This value is the one for which 
Niit
i
t  ,1  . In this equilibrium point, externalities will be absent because all the 
individuals will share the same level of information. Thus,   1* i  and we compute *  by 
solving       



***
)1( iii f  . For the assumed f function, the steady-state level of 
information is     )1/(1*   Ai ; this result is identical for every iN. 
One can also address local dynamics. This is done by evaluating the behaviour of 
equation (1) in the vicinity of the steady-state relatively to an average agent. The average 
agent is the one for which the externality is always absent since she has no informational 
advantage or disadvantage relatively to all the other elements in the group. Let jt  be the 
value of the information stored by the average agent; the corresponding accumulation 
function is  jtjtjt f   )1(1 . By constructing the Jacobian matrix for the system of 
equations containing variables it  and 
j
t  it becomes straightforward to find a condition 
ensuring stability. The linearized system in the vicinity of  *i  or  *j  (they are identical) 
takes the form, 
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The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are )1/(11 )/()1(1
  A  and 
 )1(12  . Eigenvalue 2 falls inside the unit circle, for any admissible parameter 
values, and thus one can guarantee the existence of at least one stable dimension. Full stability 
will require 1  to be larger than -1 (observe that it is necessarily lower than 1), i.e., stability 
holds under condition 1)/()1(1 )1/(1   A . The condition can be rearranged and 
presented as an upper bound on parameter A; the inequality comes      1)1(2A . If 
this condition does not hold, saddle-path stability will characterize the dynamics of the system 
in the steady-state vicinity; this result hides, as one will confirm in the next section, the 
possibility of regular or irregular bounded instability, what is revealed when looking at the 
global dynamic properties of the process one is characterizing. 
 
4 NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION 
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As previously mentioned, a group of n individuals is taken into account. They share the 
same parameter values in their information dynamic equation and they differ solely with 
respect to one feature: the initial endowment of information. To make a concrete analysis of 
information flows within the group, let us consider a numerical example. Start by assuming the 
set of parameter values (,A,,)=(0.05,0.6,0.75,2.5) and take n=5. The selected initial 
endowments are the following: 1210  , 3
2
0  , 7
3
0  , 6
4
0  , 1
5
0  . The steady-state 
value of information, common to all the individuals in the group, is straightforward to 
compute:     2073605.0/6.0 )75.01/(1*  i . However, there will be convergence to this 
equilibrium value only if the stability condition presented in the previous section holds; this 
does not occur for the selected parameter values.1 
The absence of stability will imply some other kind of long-term outcome. Specifically, 
for the initial values one has assumed, we identify the presence of everlasting irregular cycles. 
These endogenous fluctuations maintain the values of the information variables close to their 
initial levels - the process of information creation and information destruction, through 
interaction on the accumulation of a non rival good, implies this result. 
Figure 1 displays the motion of the information flow for two series, the ones 
respecting to the first two individuals in the group. The transient phase is excluded; the 
presented observations go from t=251 to t=300. It is visible, in the figure, a pattern of 
evolution of the information variables characterized by irregular fluctuations, which are 
exclusively determined by the rule of interaction one has assumed. 
 
Figure 1 - Information flows for individuals 1 and 2 
 
Source: the authors 
 
The evolution of 1t  and 
2
t  in figure 1 can only be found under the exact conditions 
in which the interaction process was established. If one changes a single feature of the 
environment, this has consequences over the whole system, implying differently shaped 
information flows. Consider, for instance, that the initial endowment of information of agent 4 
is 340  , instead of the value that was previously taken. This will change information 
trajectories in time for all the individuals in the group. In this particular case, for the same 
agents for which figure 1 was drawn, we no longer find evidence of irregular fluctuations. The 
system will rest in a state such that 1t  follows a period 4 cycle while 
2
t  will be locked in a 
cycle of periodicity 2. This is displayed in Figure 2. 
 
                                                          
1
 For the values of  and  that were given, the required constraint on A, for stability, would be A<0.1255 
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Figure 2 - Information flows for individuals 1 and 2 (with a modified initial value) 
 
Source: the authors 
 
The example has illustrated that initial conditions matter for the dynamics of 
information flows. For a given set of initial values, one might also cause a change in the 
structure of interaction by introducing elements into the group or by removing elements from 
the group. As a further illustration, recover the original set of initial values and consider that at 
t=275, the fourth and the fifth individuals abandon the group. The pattern of interaction 
necessarily changes. In this specific case, the irregular path initially observed gives place to a 
period 2 cycle for both individuals 1 and 2, as one can observe in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 - Information flows for individuals 1 and 2 (when individuals 4 and 5 abandon the 
group at t=275) 
 
Source: the authors 
 
Even though no change was introduced in the structure of the model (in the underlying 
parameter values or in the shape of the functions the dynamic rule contains), one observes 
that the interaction is sensitive to initial endowments and to the number of individuals in the 
group. This illustrates the complexity of the dynamics of a group, when a connection is 
established between the respective decision processes. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
Orlando Gomes; Rui Franganito 
Perspectivas em Gestão & Conhecimento, João Pessoa, v. 3, n. 2, p. 237-243, jul./dez. 2013 
   
243 
Individuals accumulate information on a given subject resorting to their own previous 
knowledge on the environment that surrounds them. However, information has a non rival 
nature and, as a consequence, the interaction with others is essential, as well, in terms of 
generation / destruction of the information that the individual agent possesses. Therefore, to 
understand the dynamics of information flows, one needs to analyze how the group under 
analysis is effectively organized and structured. A numerical inspection has allowed to 
conclude that even when the individual agent maintains intact her own capabilities to 
accumulate information, slight changes on the behavior of others or of the system itself (e.g., 
the entering or exiting of new members on the group) may induce a radical modification\ on 
the qualitative nature of the corresponding information flow. For instance, completely erratic 
time trajectories can be transformed in period 2 cycles just by changing the composition of the 
group.  
The analysis has allowed to illustrate how individual conditions might suffer a relevant 
impact from changes occurring within the considered group. The setup can be adapted to 
different environments, but it is specially suited to deal with issues of transactive memory (i.e., 
the memory generated and stored within group relations), namely in what concerns 
applications in the study of human resources management. 
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